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Abstract
We present a game show that we claim can serve as a proxy for the notorious
Sleeping Beauty Problem. This problem has divided commentators into two
camps, ‘halfers’ and ‘thirders’. In our game show, the potential awakenings of
Sleeping Beauty, during which she will be asked about the outcome of the coin
toss that determined earlier how many times she is awakened and asked, are
replaced by potential contestants, deciding whether to choose heads or tails in
a bet they will get to place if chosen as contestants on the outcome of the coin
toss that determined earlier how many of them are chosen as contestants. This
game show bears out the basic intuition of the thirders. Our goal in this paper,
however, is not to settle the dispute between halfers and thirders but to draw
attention to our game-show proxy itself, which realizes a version of the Sleeping
Beauty Problem without the ambiguities plaguing the original. In this spirit,
we design similar game-show proxies for variations on the Sleeping Beauty
Problem with stochastic experiments other than a coin toss. We do the same
for a variation in which Sleeping Beauty must decide upon being awakened
whether or not to switch doors in the famous Monty Hall Problem and have
the number of awakenings during which she gets to make that decision depend
on the door she picked before she was put to sleep.
1 The Three Stooges on Monty Hall
Consider the following puzzle. In a special edition of his famous game show, “Let’s
make a deal,” Monty Hall calls the Three Stooges to the stage and has them col-
lectively pick one of three doors, D1, D2 or D3. Behind one are two checks for a
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thousand dollars each, behind the other two is a goat. The Three Stooges pick D2.
Before the show goes to a commercial break, Monty tells the Three Stooges that
either one or two of them will be called back after the break. If they were wrong,
only one of them will return (but he doesn’t tell them which one!); if they were right,
the other two will. During the break, the Three Stooges are made to take a nap
backstage. When the show resumes, they are sound asleep.
If the checks are not behind D2, Monty wakes up Curly and brings him back to
the stage, making sure he has no idea whether he is the first or the second one to
be woken up and brought back. As usual, Monty opens either D1 or D3 (whichever
one has a goat behind it) and offers Curly to switch from D2 to the other door that
remains unopened. Curly is given ample time to make up his mind. If the door he
ends up choosing has the two checks behind it, he gets one of them. If not, he goes
home empty-handed.
If the checks are behind D2, Monty goes through this same routine twice, with
Moe and Larry (not necessarily in that order), the only other difference being that
he now has a choice whether to open D1 or D3. Monty once again makes sure that
neither of them finds out whether they were woken up and brought back first or
second (at least not until Monty opens the door with the checks behind it, one of
which may be gone at that point).
What is a Stooge to do in this predicament? Should he switch? Should he stay
with the door they originally picked? Does it make any difference whether he stays
or switches?
2 Game-show proxies for (variations on) the Sleep-
ing Beauty Problem
The puzzle in section 1 combines elements of two well-known puzzles challenging
our intuitions about probability: the Monty Hall Problem and the Sleeping Beauty
Problem.1 The solution of the Monty Hall Problem is no longer controversial. A
contestant in a normal episode of “Let’s make a deal” (without the funny business of
putting contestants to sleep and waking them up again) should always take Monty
Hall up on his offer to switch. Since Monty Hall never opens the door with the prize
behind it and thus has to know which door that is, we need to assume that he offers
contestants to switch regardless of which door they initially picked but that (weak)
assumption is routinely granted.
1There is a vast literature on both. Good places to start are the wikipedia entries for these two
problems.
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The intuition that the opening of a door and the offer to switch are just for
dramatic effect and do not affect the contestant’s chances of winning is simply wrong.
The opening of one of the doors provides the contestant with important information.
A simple and (judging by its ubiquity on the web) effective way to make the point is
this. Initially, the contestant only has a 1/3 chance of picking the right door and a
2/3 chance of picking the wrong one. Suppose he (or she) switches. If he was right
the first time, he will now be wrong. If he was wrong the first time, he will now be
right. So he now has a 2/3 chance of being right and only a 1/3 chance of being
wrong. In a slogan, he flips the odds by switching. A device often used to shore up
one’s intuitions in this case is to increase the number of doors. If there are n doors
(n ≥ 3), the contestant initially has a 1/n chance of picking the right one and a
(n − 1)/n chance of picking the wrong one. After the contestant has made her (or
his) initial choice, Monty Hall opens all but one of the remaining doors and offers
her to switch. Once again, the contestant flips the initial odds by switching. By
switching, she effectively guesses that the prize is not behind the door she initially
picked but behind any one of the other n− 1 doors, all but one of which Monty Hall
has meanwhile opened for her.
Unlike the Monty Hall Problem, the Sleeping Beauty Problem remains contro-
versial. The problem is essentially the following. Sleeping Beauty is told that a fair
coin will be tossed after she’s been put to sleep and that, when she is woken up, she
will be asked what her degree of belief is that the coin came up heads. It depends
on the outcome of that coin toss, however, how many times she is asked. If the coin
comes up heads, she will only be woken up and asked once. If the coin comes up
tails, she will be woken up and asked twice. The first time she’s woken up after the
coin comes up tails she is given some amnesia drug so that she won’t remember the
second time that she’s been woken up before and asked the same question. Every
precaution is taken to make sure that Sleeping Beauty, when she wakes up, cannot
tell whether her current awakening is the one after the coin came up heads or one of
the two after the coin came up tails. What should Sleeping Beauty’s degree of belief
be upon being awakened that the coin came up heads?
One knee-jerk response is that, no matter how often Sleeping Beauty is put to
sleep, woken up and drugged, the probability that a fair coin comes up heads is and
remains 1/2. Therefore, her answer every time she is asked should be 1/2. Another
knee-jerk response is that, if the coin comes up tails, Sleeping Beauty is twice as
likely to be asked than if the coin comes up heads. Therefore, her answer every time
she is asked should be 1/3. Those who think the answer is 1/2 are known as halfers.
Those who think the answer is 1/3 are known as thirders. The debate between halfers
and thirders has long moved beyond this clash of intuitions upon first encountering
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the problem. In fact, it persists only because it is ambiguous exactly what Sleeping
Beauty is being asked.
To get a better handle on the Sleeping Beauty Problem and inspired by the Monty
Hall Problem, we design a game-show proxy for it, in which potential contestants
take over the role of potential awakenings. Our analysis will show that both halfers
and thirders are right, depending on how one interprets the question Sleeping Beauty
is asked. That said, our game-show proxy will be much more congenial to thirders
than to halfers as it implements the interpretation of the question they consider to
be the interesting one. Should the information that Sleeping Beauty is given ahead
of time about what will happen depending on the outcome of one toss of a fair coin
change her degree of belief upon being awakened that this particular coin toss resulted
in heads? Upon a little reflection, both halfers and thirders will agree that if that is
the question, Sleeping Beauty would be just as mistaken to ignore this information
as contestants on “Let’s make a deal” would be to ignore the information Monty Hall
is giving them by opening one of the three doors.
Just as Sleeping Beauty knows how a coin toss will decide how many of her
potential awakenings will become actual awakenings, potential contestants in our
game-show proxy know how a coin toss will decide how many of them become actual
contestants. Both Sleeping Beauty and our potential contestants are asked to assess
(one way or another) the probability that this coin toss resulted in heads when woken
up or chosen as a contestant, respectively. Using Bayes’ rule, they should update
their degree of belief that the coin came up heads in light of the information about
how potential awakenings/contestants become actual awakenings/contestants. In the
spirit of a time-honored Bayesian tradition (based on the principle of that you put
your money where your mouth is), we will cash out the degrees of belief of our game-
show contestants in terms of betting behavior. If our contestants update according
to Bayes’ rule (and the same is true for Sleeping Beauty), their prior degrees of belief,
determined by the symmetry of the coin, get replaced by posterior degrees of belief
that are determined by the numbers of contestants (awakenings) chosen for the two
possible outcomes of the coin toss—1 for heads, 2 for tails in the original problem
but those numbers can be chosen arbitrarily.
Similar game-show proxies can be designed for variations on the Sleeping Beauty
Problem in which the coin toss is replaced by a different stochastic experiment with
an arbitrary number of equiprobable outcomes and arbitrary numbers of candidates
(awakenings) for different outcomes. As in the case of the Monty Hall Problem, a
good way to shore up one’s intuitions in dealing with the Sleeping Beauty Problem,
as we will see in sections 3–4, is to vary these parameters. In section 5, we illustrate
this strategy for getting a handle on the Sleeping Beauty Problem by designing a
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game-show proxy for a variation on the problem that combines it with the Monty
Hall Problem (for arbitrary numbers of doors and awakenings). The scenario with
the Three Stooges in section 1 is our game-show proxy for this variation on the
Sleeping Beauty Problem for three doors and three awakenings.
3 Pitching a new game show: “Ignore the (initial)
odds!”
Given the central role of switching doors in Monty Hall’s “Let’s make a deal,” his
game show might as well have been called “Flip the odds.” We will call the class
of game shows introduced and analyzed in this section “Ignore the odds.” In both
cases, the odds in the title refer to the initial odds (better: probabilities, chances,
degrees of belief), determined by symmetries of some physical object.
In “Ignore the odds,” the host starts by selecting (not necessarily randomly) a
pool of N candidates or potential contestants from the audience. These candidates
are carefully sequestered before the host proceeds to perform a simple stochastic ex-
periment with n equiprobable outcomes Oi (i = 1, . . . , n): flipping coins, rolling fair
dice, spinning a roulette wheel, drawing balls from a lottery ball machine, drawing
cards from a deck, etc. Different stochastic experiments can be used in different ver-
sions or different episodes of the show. Depending on the outcome of the experiment,
the host then calls up, one by one, one or more of the N candidates to become actual
contestants on the show. Each contestant is given a certain amount of money, say a
thousand dollars, to place a bet, at even odds,2 on one of the n possible outcomes
of the experiment the host just performed (that very experiment, not a repetition
of it). If they are right, they go home with two thousand dollars; if they are wrong,
they go home empty-handed.
If contestants were randomly selected from a pool of N candidates, their chances
of winning the bet would be 1/n regardless of which outcome Oi they choose to
put their money on. This probability is determined simply by symmetries of the
physical object(s) used in the stochastic experiment. As long as he or she does not
know anything about the selection procedure, a contestant’s degree of belief that the
outcome was Oi should be 1/n for all i. In Bayesian terms, these should be his or
her prior degrees of belief or priors for short:
Pr(Oi) =
1
n
. (1)
2The restriction to bets at even odds can be relaxed but this would unnecessarily complicate
the analysis.
5
In “Ignore the odds,” however, the selection procedure is anything but random
and, more importantly, all candidates know that it is not. The procedure still gives all
of them an equal chance of becoming a contestant,3 but how many candidates become
contestants depends on the outcome of the very stochastic experiment contestants
will be betting on.
Figure 1: “Ignore the odds” with eight potential contestants and a lottery ball ma-
chine as the stochastic experiment (Drawing by Laurent Taudin).
Here is how it works in detail. At the beginning of the show the candidates are
divided into groups assigned to different outcomes. The sizes of these groups will
be different for different outcomes. The candidates are told the sizes of the groups
for all outcomes but they are not told in which group they are. Candidates become
contestants if and only if they happen to be in the group for the actual outcome of
the stochastic experiment. The host will call up all members of this group, one by
one, to place their bet.
3In section 5, however, we will consider a variation on the selection procedure used in sections
3 and 4, in which this is no longer true.
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To make sure that a candidate, when chosen as a contestant, knows neither the
outcome of the stochastic experiment nor whether any other candidates have already
been called up as contestants, all candidates are put into individual cubicles after the
host has explained to them how contestants will be chosen but before he carries out
the stochastic experiment (see Fig. 1). When a cubicle’s door is closed, the candidate
inside cannot detect in any way what is going on outside of it. The candidates are
given the sizes of the groups for all outcomes before they are sent to their cubicles.
Each cubicle is equipped with two lights, one on the inside, one on the outside,
which will be switched on to let the candidate inside and the audience outside know
that the candidate in that particular cubicle has been chosen as a contestant. The
candidate-turned-contestant then leaves her (or his) cubicle, closes the door behind
her (which turns off the lights), places the bet and finds out whether she lost or
won. Unless she is the final contestant, she is only allowed to watch the rest of
the show from a place where the contestants coming after her cannot see her (nor
detect her presence in any other way). Once all members of the group of candidates
chosen as contestants have placed their bets, the remaining candidates are allowed
to leave their cubicles and the show is over. How can the candidates take advantage
of the information they are given about the selection of contestants to improve their
chances of winning their bets when chosen as a contestant?
Let Ni be the number of candidates in the group assigned to the outcome Oi.
These Ni’s can be any non-negative integers that add up to the total number of
candidates N . Of course, the number of candidates will itself be a number chosen
by the host or the producers of the show. Note that one or more Ni’s are allowed
to be zero. If Nj = 0 and Oj happens to be the result of the stochastic experiment,
no candidates will become contestants. That is not a problem. The host can simply
repeat the stochastic experiment until he gets an outcome Ok for which Nk 6= 0. We
can think of the instances in which the stochastic experiment produces a result Oj
for which Nj = 0 as runs of the game where the game is over before contestants are
called to the stage.
The candidates can use Bayes’ rule to update the priors in Eq. (1) to take into
account the information they are given about how candidates become contestants
and use their posterior degrees of belief (or posteriors for short) when deciding on
which outcome to put their money if and when actually chosen as a contestant. They
can do this updating as soon as they have been given the group sizes Ni, even though
their beliefs do not really matter unless and until they become contestants.
We will first do this Bayesian updating for the simple case in which the stochastic
experiment is a single coin toss. We then generalize the results to arbitrary stochastic
experiments with n equiprobable outcomes.
7
For a single toss of a fair coin, we have
n = 2, O1 = H, O2 = T, N1 = NH , N2 = NT , N = NH + NT . (2)
H and T stand for ‘Heads’ and ‘Tails’, respectively. NH and NT are the number of
candidates in the groups for heads and tails, respectively. These should add up to
the total number of candidates, N . The prior degrees of belief for any candidate that
the coin will come up heads or tails, respectively, are:
Pr(H) = Pr(T ) =
1
2
. (3)
After all candidates have been given the numbers NH and NT , they go into their
cubicles and the doors are closed. The host then tosses the coin. If the coin comes
up heads, the NH candidates in the group for heads are chosen as contestants. If
the coin comes up tails, the NT candidates in the group for tails are. One by one,
the candidates in the chosen group will see the light in their cubicle go on and get
to place their bet.
We calculate the degrees of belief that an arbitrary candidate, sitting in her (or
his) cubicle waiting for the light to go on, should have that the coin came up heads
or tails, respectively, given everything she knows about how candidates are chosen to
become contestants. In Bayesian terms, we need to calculate the posteriors Pr(H |A)
and Pr(T |A), where
A = I, a candidate, have been chosen as a contestant
(‘A’ stands for actual as opposed to potential contestant). Implicit in this definition
of A is that the selection took place according to the rules of the show, including
those specifying what all candidates will be told about the selection procedure.
According to Bayes’ rule, these posteriors are given by:
Pr(H |A) = Pr(A |H) Pr(H)
Pr(A |H) Pr(H) + Pr(A |T ) Pr(T ) ,
(4)
Pr(T |A) = Pr(A |T ) Pr(H)
Pr(A |H) Pr(H) + Pr(A |T ) Pr(T ) .
Since the priors Pr(H) = Pr(T ) = 1/2 (see Eq. (1)), this simplifies to
Pr(H |A) = Pr(A |H)
Pr(A |H) + Pr(A |T ) , Pr(T |A) =
Pr(A |T )
Pr(A |H) + Pr(A |T ) . (5)
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The evaluation of the posteriors thus comes down to the evaluation of the likelihoods
Pr(A |H) and Pr(A |T ) on the right-hand side.
One might be tempted to set Pr(A |H) = Pr(A |T ) = 1/2 on the argument that
the probability of any candidate being chosen as a contestant is 1/2 regardless of the
outcome of the coin toss. In that case, we would also have Pr(H |A) = Pr(T |A) =
1/2. We would be ignoring the information, however, that different numbers of
candidates will become contestants depending on the outcome of the coin toss. That
information also needs to be taken into account.
If the coin came up heads (H) and the candidate is chosen as a contestant (A), she
knows that she must be one of the members of the group for heads. The likelihood
Pr(A |H) is thus equal to the probability that she belongs to that group. Great
precautions have been taken to make sure that, as far as she can tell, she could be
any one of the N candidates. The probability that she (or any other candidate)
belongs to the group for heads is therefore simply the number of candidates NH in
that group divided by the total number of candidates N . A similar argument can be
given for Pr(A |T ). Hence
Pr(A |H) = NH
N
, Pr(A |T ) = NT
N
. (6)
Inserting these expressions in Eq. (5), we arrive at
Pr(H |A) = NH
NH + NT
=
NH
N
, Pr(T |A) = NT
NH + NT
=
NT
N
. (7)
These posteriors replace the priors in Eq. (3). Since the posteriors in Eq. (7) only
depend on NH and NT , candidates will already know as they are sitting in their
cubicles waiting for the light to go on, whether they will choose heads or tails, should
they be called up as contestants. If NH > NT , they choose heads. If NT > NH , they
choose tails. If NH = NT = N/2, they get no information that would increase their
chances of winning their bet. For NH = N (or, similarly, NT = N), finally, the game
becomes trivial: all contestants would be guaranteed to win. If the coin comes up
heads, the host calls up all contestants, if it comes up tails, he just flips it again.
This is an extreme version of a general mechanism that helps us understand why
the posteriors in Eq. (7) are what they are. Imagine that this episode of “Ignore the
odds” (with the same coin and the same pool of potential contestants) is repeated
X times (with X a very large integer). I now put myself in the shoes of an arbitrary
potential contestant. I will be chosen as a contestant in about NH/N of the roughly
X/2 runs of the show in which the coin will come up heads and in about NT/N of
the roughly X/2 runs in which the coin will come up tails (if NH = 0 or NT = 0 the
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show will be over without any contestants being chosen in roughly X/2 runs and I
will be chosen as a contestant in the roughly X/2 remaining runs). Overall, I will
thus to be chosen as a contestant in about
NH
N
X
2
+
NT
N
X
2
(8)
runs. Since NH + NT = N , Eq. (8) confirms that, overall, I expect to be chosen
as a contestant in about half of the X runs. However, Eq. (8) also shows that, if
NT > NH , I expect to be a candidate in runs where the coin comes up tails more
often than in runs in which the coin comes up heads. In other words, that I (or
any other potential contestant) should use Eq. (7) and set the probabilities that a
fair coin came up heads or tails equal to NH/N <
1
2
and NT/N >
1
2
, respectively, is
simply to take into account this sampling bias.
What Eq. (7) shows is that the procedure for selecting contestants from an initial
pool of candidates has the effect of erasing the priors in Eq. (3), determined by the
symmetry of the coin, and replacing them by posteriors determined by our choice
of the sizes NH and NT of the two groups into which we divided the N candidates
we started with. What Eq. (7) shows then is that we can basically change the
priors to any posteriors we want. That is why we called this game show “Ignore the
odds”—the initial odds that is.
These results can readily be extended to arbitrary stochastic experiments with n
equiprobable outcomes Oi (i = 1, . . . , n). The prior degrees of belief for any candidate
that the experiment will result in Oi are
Pr(Oi) =
1
n
. (9)
For each outcome Oi there will be Ni ≥ 0 potential candidates (the host will repeat
the stochastic experiment until he gets an outcome Oj for which Nj 6= 0). Eq. (4)
straightforwardly generalizes to:
Pr(Oi |A) = Pr(A |Oi) Pr(Oi)∑n
j=1 Pr(A |Oj) Pr(Oj)
. (10)
Given Eq. (9), this reduces to (cf. Eq. (5)):
Pr(Oi |A) = Pr(A |Oi)∑n
j=1 Pr(A |Oj)
. (11)
The candidate’s knowledge about the selection procedure tells him or her that the
likelihoods are given by (cf. Eq. (6) and the reasoning leading up to it)
Pr(A |Oi) = Ni
N
. (12)
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Inserting this expression for the likelihoods on the right-hand of Eq. (11), we see that
Eq. (7) generalizes to:
Pr(Oi |A) = Ni
N
. (13)
Once again, we see that the procedure for selecting contestants from an initial pool
of candidates has the effect of erasing priors (see Eq. (9)), determined by symmetries
of physical objects used in a stochastic experiment, and replacing them by posteriors
(see Eq. (13)), determined by the choice of the numbers Ni, subject only to the
requirement that they add up to N , the number of candidates we started out with.
Like Eq. (7), Eq. (13) can be seen as expressing a certain sampling bias. Imagine
that this episode of “Ignore the odds” (with the same stochastic experiment and
the same pool of potential contestants) is repeated X times (with X a very large
integer). I put myself in the shoes of an arbitrary potential contestant in these X
runs of the game. Suppose there are m < n outcomes Oj for which Nj = 0. That
means in that in roughly m(X/n) runs of the game, no contestants are chosen. In
the remaining (n −m)(X/n) runs, I will be chosen as a contestant in about Ni/N
of the roughly X/n runs in which the outcome of the stochastic experiment is Oi.
Overall, I will thus be chosen in about
n∑
i=1
Ni
N
X
n
(14)
runs. Since
∑n
i=1Ni = N , Eq. (14) confirms that I expect to be chosen as a contestant
in about X/n runs overall. However, Eq. (14) also shows that, if Nk > Nl > 0, I
expect to be a candidate in runs with outcome Ok more often than in runs with
outcome Ol. In other words, that I (or any other potential contestant) should use
Eq. (13) and choose a value other than 1/n for the probability that the stochastic
experiment under consideration results in one of its n equiprobable outcomes is
simply to take into account this sampling bias.
4 Game-show proxy for Sleeping Beauty Problem
Our proxy for the Sleeping Beauty Problem is a special case of the game show ana-
lyzed with malice aforethought in Eqs. (2)–(8) in Section 3. It is a version or episode
of “Ignore the odds” in which the stochastic experiment is a single toss of a fair coin.
We analyzed this game show for an arbitrary number of candidates N divided into
groups for heads and tails, containing NH and NT candidates, respectively. To turn
this into a proxy for the Sleeping Beauty Problem, we set N = 3 (the minimum
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number of candidates for which this version of “Ignore the odds” is non-trivial) and
NH = 1.
The parameters NH , NT and N introduced in Eq. (2) thus have the values:
NH = 1, NT = 2, N = 3. (15)
Candidates (potential contestants) are the analogues of potential awakenings. The
one candidate chosen to become an actual contestant if the coin comes up heads is the
analogue of the one potential awakening of Sleeping Beauty that becomes an actual
awakening if the coin comes up heads. The two contestants chosen after the coin
comes up tails are the analogues of the two potential awakenings that become actual
awakenings if the coin comes up tails. Just as there is probability of 1/2 for all three
candidates in the game show to become contestants, there is a probability of 1/2
for all three potential awakenings of Sleeping Beauty to become actual awakenings.
The drugging of Sleeping Beauty ensures that during subsequent awakenings she
knows as little about preceding awakenings as any contestant coming out of his or
her cubicle knows about other contestants in the game-show proxy for the Sleeping
Beauty Problem.
It may seem that there is still an important difference between potential contes-
tants and potential awakenings. It is easy to tell potential contestants apart: we
could use their Social Security Numbers (SSNs), for instance. Every potential con-
testant will presumably know at all times what his or her SSN is. How can we tell
Sleeping Beauty’s potential awakenings apart? How can Sleeping Beauty herself tell
her own potential awakenings apart? Fortunately, these questions have an easy an-
swer. We can specify, for any potential awakening, at what time and on what date it
will happen if it will happen at all (allowing ten minutes or so for each awakening).
We then put a clock that displays both time and date in the room where Sleeping
Beauty is awakened so that she can tell, every time she is woken up, which potential
awakening has just become an actual awakening. Just as we had no need to refer
to a potential candidate’s SSN, we will have no need to refer to date and time of a
potential awakening. The point is that, at least in principle, individuating potential
awakenings is no more problematic than individuating potential contestants.4
4This way of providing potential awakenings with a time stamp should not be conflated with the
time stamps used in the standard version of the Sleeping Beauty Problem. There Sleeping Beauty
is told ahead of time that she will be woken up a second time on Tuesday if the coin comes up tails.
In that case, Sleeping Beauty, when awakened, can obviously not be allowed to find out what day
of the week it is (at least not until she has answered the question what her degree of belief is that
the coin came up heads). In our version, she is told only that two of the three potential awakenings
(labeled by the time and date they will happen) will become actual awakenings if the coin comes
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Sleeping Beauty has no reason to doubt that the coin used to determine whether
she will be woken up once or twice is fair. In other words, her prior degree of belief
that the coin will come up heads is
Pr(H) =
1
2
. (16)
What is Sleeping Beauty’s degree of belief, once she is woken up, that the partic-
ular toss of this coin that decided how many times she would be awakened resulted
in heads? In Bayesian terms, was is her posterior Pr(H |A)? Here A is defined as
A = I, Sleeping Beauty, have been awakened,
where ‘A’ stand for actual rather than potential awakening. Implicit in the definition
of A is that which potential awakenings become actual awakenings is determined by
the protocol spelled out in the Sleeping Beauty Problem, including the provisions
about what Sleeping Beauty is to be told about this protocol.
With this reinterpretation of A and using the values of the parameters in Eq.
(15), we can use the first half of Eq. (7) for Sleeping Beauty’s posterior degree of
belief that the coin came up heads:
Pr(H |A) = NH
N
=
1
3
. (17)
This follows directly from Eq. (6) for the likelihoods Pr(A |H) and Pr(A |T ).
Since this is the crux of the matter, we transfer the reasoning leading up to Eq.
(6) back to the Sleeping Beauty Problem. We do so for arbitrary values of NH and
N . If the coin came up heads (H) and she has been awakened (A), that awakening
must be one of the NH potential awakenings that become actual awakenings if the
coin came up heads. The likelihood Pr(A |H) is thus equal to the probability that
Sleeping Beauty’s current awakening is one of those NH potential awakenings. Great
precautions have been taken to make sure that Sleeping Beauty, when she wakes
up, has no way to tell whether her current awakening is one of the NH potential
awakenings after the coin came up heads or one of the NT potential awakenings after
the coin came up tails. The probability that her current awakening is one of former
is therefore the number NH of such potential awakenings divided by the number N
of all potential awakenings.
up tails. She is not told which two. In that case, the date and the time she is awakened are as
irrelevant to Sleeping Beauty’s assessment of her degree of belief that the coin came up heads as
the SSN of a potential contestant in “Ignore the odds” is to his or her calculation of the posteriors
Pr(H |A) and Pr(T |A) (see Eqs. (4)–(7)).
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In Section 2, we noted that the Monty Hall Problem becomes more intuitive if the
number of doors is increased. The solution to the Sleeping Beauty Problem likewise
becomes more intuitive if the number of potential awakenings or, in our game-proxy
for the problem, the number of potential contestants is increased. Instead of the
values in Eq. (15), we choose
NH = 1, NT = 99, N = 100. (18)
In this case, Eq. (17) tells us that Sleeping Beauty’s degree of belief that the coin
came up heads plummets from its initial value of 1/2 to just 1/100.
Like Eq. (7) and Eq. (13), Eq. (17) can be seen as expressing a certain sampling
bias. Imagine we repeat the experiment with Sleeping Beauty X times where X
is an arbitrary large integer. In the roughly X/2 runs in which the coin comes up
heads, the total number of awakenings of Sleeping Beauty will be about NH(X/2).
In the roughly X/2 runs in which the coin will come up tails, the total number
of awakenings will be about NT (X/2). In all runs combined, the total number of
awakenings will thus be NH(X/2) + NT (X/2) = N(X/2). If NT > NH , more of
these awakenings occur during runs in which the coin comes up tails than during
runs in which the coin comes up heads. That Sleeping Beauty uses Eq. (17) to set
the probability that a fair coin came up heads equal to NH/N 6= 12 is simply to take
into account this sampling bias.
Eq. (17) shows that, as long as our game show can be used as a proxy for the
Sleeping Beauty Problem, the thirders are right and the halfers are wrong. There is
a simple way, however, of reconciling the two positions. Once again imagine that the
experiment with Sleeping Beauty is repeated many times. Ask Sleeping Beauty to
answer the following pair of questions:
Question #1: What is the probability that in an arbitrarily chosen run the coin
comes up heads? Answer: 1/2.
Question #2: What is the probability that an arbitrarily chosen awakening hap-
pens during a run in which the coin comes up heads? Answer: NH/N (which
works out to 1/3 for the values given in Eq. (15)).
One can debate—and commentators have!—whether question #1 or question #2 is
the more natural way of interpreting the question in the original Sleeping Beauty
Problem and whether the problem doesn’t become trivial once you accept that halfers
and thirders are just interpreting it differently. We will not get into those debates.
We simply note that, although both questions are relevant to our game-show proxy
(the answer to question #2 presupposes the answer to question #1), it is the second
question that makes this game show and others like it intrinsically interesting.
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5 Switch or stay? Sleeping Beauty on Monty Hall
Suppose Sleeping Beauty is a contestant on “Let’s make a deal.” She is asked to
choose between doors D1, D2 and D3. Behind one of those are two checks for a
thousand dollars each; behind the other two is a goat. Sleeping Beauty chooses D2.
Monty Hall offers her the usual deal but with a twist. The twist is that he will only
open one of the other doors and give her the opportunity to switch after she’s been
put under and woken up, possibly twice (in which case he will have to administer an
amnesia drug the first time). Every time she is awakened she is offered the same deal
and Monty Hall will open one of the doors (not necessarily the same one each time)
and offer her to switch. If Sleeping Beauty was right the first time and the checks
are behind D2, she will be woken up twice. If she was wrong the first time and the
checks are behind D1 or D3, she will only be woken up once. That she might have to
be drugged once, Monty tells her, is well worth it, as she will get one of the checks
each time she picks the right door and could thus conceivably walk away with two
thousand dollars.
Sleeping Beauty takes the deal. When awakened, should she switch doors, should
she stay with the one she originally picked or should she be indifferent between
switching and staying? As with the original version of the Monty Hall Problem and
Sleeping Beauty Problem, people will probably respond differently when first faced
with this conundrum. Those who have not seen either problem before might want to
say that the opening of one of the doors changes the probability that the checks are
behind D2 from 1/3 to 1/2 and that the putting to sleep, waking up and drugging
of Sleeping Beauty does nothing to change that probability. Sleeping Beauty should
thus be indifferent between staying and switching. Those familiar with the Monty
Hall Problem but not with the Sleeping Beauty Problem will split into two camps.
The knee-jerk ‘halfer’ response would be that the probabilities of the prize being
behind one door and the goats behind the two others are what they are no matter
how often Sleeping Beauty is put to sleep, woken up and drugged. The problem,
therefore, is no different from the original Monty Hall Problem and Sleeping Beauty
should switch. The knee-jerk ‘thirder’ response would be that, since Sleeping Beauty
is woken up twice as often when she gets it right the first time than when she gets
it wrong, her chance of being right the first time goes up to 2/3. Sleeping Beauty
should thus stay with D2.
Imagine an audience that is a mix of these three groups all eager to pipe up and
tell Sleeping Beauty what to do. Unfortunately, the audience will have to remain
absolutely silent during every awakening. Should Sleeping Beauty have to be woken
up a second time, the audience already knows behind which door the checks are.
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Unless they have it in for her, they would now all give her the same advice. During
the second awakening, Monty therefore cannot allow any audience interference. That
will be clear to Sleeping Beauty as well. Hence, Monty cannot allow any audience
interference during the first awakening either. Sleeping Beauty should have no way
of knowing whether this is her first or her second awakening.
The episode of “Let’s make a deal” with the Three Stooges in section 1 is essen-
tially our game-show proxy for this Sleeping Beauty on Monty Hall Problem. Rather
than putting candidates or potential contestants (the Three Stooges in this case) to
sleep, however, we put them in the kind of cubicles used in “Ignore the odds” (see
section 3). We will call this new game-show proxy “Switch or stay?”
As is section 1, we assume the three candidates initially pick D2. They are now
divided in two groups. Two of them are assigned to D2, one of them is assigned to the
other two doors. This game then is different from the one we introduced and analyzed
in section 3. There all candidates were assigned to one of the n −m equiprobable
outcomes Oi for which Ni 6= 0, which means that they all have the same chance
1/(n − m) of being chosen as a contestant regardless of the exact values of these
non-zero Ni’s. In this case, the three candidates are not assigned to equiprobable
outcomes. As a result, their chance of being chosen as a contestant depends on
the exact values of the non-zero Ni’s and they cannot just ignore that the initial
probability that the prize is behind D1 or D3 is twice as large as the initial probability
that the prize is behind D2. In other words, “Switch or stay?” is not simply a
special case of “Ignore the odds.” Its analysis, however, is completely analogous to
the analysis of “Ignore the odds” in section 3.
In this case, we have two (non-equiprobable) outcomes
D2 = Checks behind 2nd door, not-D2 = Checks not behind 2nd door. (19)
The priors are
Pr(D2) =
1
3
, Pr(not-D2) =
2
3
. (20)
We have three candidates divided into two groups (one of two, one of one) assigned
to these two outcomes:
ND2 = 2, Nnot-D2 = 1, N = ND2 + Nnot-D2 = 3. (21)
The likelihoods are (cf. Eq. (6) and the reasoning leading up to it):
Pr(A |D2) = ND2
N
=
2
3
, Pr(A | not-D2) = Nnot-D2
N
=
1
3
(22)
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The posteriors are given by Bayes’ rule:5
Pr(D2 |A) = Pr(A |D2) Pr(D2)
Pr(A |D2) Pr(D2) + Pr(A | not-D2) Pr(not-D2) ,
(23)
Pr(not-D2 |A) = Pr(A | not-D2) Pr(not-D2)
Pr(A |D2) Pr(D2) + Pr(A | not-D2) Pr(not-D2) .
From Eqs. (20) and (22), we see that
Pr(A |D2) Pr(D2) = Pr(A | not-D2) Pr(not-D2) = 2
9
, (24)
which means that the posteriors in Eq. (23) are
Pr(Dj |A) = Pr(not-Dj |A) = 1
2
. (25)
In other words, our contestants (and, by analogy, Sleeping Beauty) should take the
advice of those who tell her to simply ignore the putting to the sleep, the waking, the
drugging and the opening of one of the three doors! The sampling bias introduced
by our peculiar procedure of selecting contestants from an initial group of candidates
wipes out the advantage of switching doors, which a contestant would have had under
normal circumstances.
Of course, we can just as easily create a version of the Sleeping Beauty on Monty
Hall Problem in which she increases her chances of picking the right door from 1/3
to 2/3 by staying. To do that, we replace the values of ND2 , Nnot-D2 and N in Eq.
(21) by
ND2 = 4, Nnot-D2 = 1, N = 5. (26)
In this case, the Three Stooges in section 1 need to be replaced by, say, the Jackson
Five. Inserting the numbers in Eq. (26) into Eq. (22) for the likelihoods, we find
Pr(A |D2) = ND2
N
=
4
5
, Pr(A | not-D2) = Nnot-D2
N
=
1
5
(27)
Inserting Eq. (20) for the priors and Eq. (27) for the likelihoods into Eq. (23) for the
posteriors, we find
Pr(D2 |A) = 2
3
, Pr(not-D2 |A) = 1
3
. (28)
5Eq. (23) is the analogue of Eq. (4) and Eq. (10). However, since Pr(D2) 6= Pr(not-D2) in this
case, Eq. (23) does not reduce to the analogues of Eqs. (5) and (11), respectively.
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In this case, Sleeping Beauty should clearly stay with D2.
If we assign two or more awakenings to not-D2, we can create a game-show proxy
for the resulting version of the Sleeping Beauty on Monty Hall Problem with three
equiprobable outcomes, just as in “Ignoring the odds” in section 3, rather than two
non-equiprobable outcomes as we did above:
D1 = Checks behind 1st door,
D2 = Checks behind 2nd door, (29)
D3 = Checks behind 3rd door,
As in section 3, groups of size Ni > 0 (i = 1, 2, 3) will be assigned to each one of
these three outcomes. When we use this format, candidates are told that they will
become contestants if and only if they are in the group assigned to the door that
has the prize behind it. In “Switch or stay?”—played by the rules analyzed in Eqs.
(19)–(25)—candidates are told that they will become contestants if and only if they
are either in a group assigned to one door (the one they picked) or in group assigned
to a pair of doors (the two they did not pick).
Suppose, once again, that the candidates initially pick D2. If we want contestants
to be indifferent between switching and staying in this format of the game show, we
need at least four candidates and choose the Ni’s as follows:
N1 = 1, N2 = 2, N3 = 1, N = 4. (30)
Eq. (13) from section 3 tells us that
Pr(D2 |A) = N2
N
, Pr(not-D2 |A) = Pr(D1 |A) + Pr(D3 |A) = N1
N
+
N3
N
. (31)
Inserting the values in Eq. (30), we see that these posteriors are equal to 1/2 in
this case. Once again, Sleeping Beauty should be indifferent between switching and
staying.
All these results can easily be generalized from 3 to n doors (and n− 1 checks!).
We will do this only for the format in which we assign one candidate to all doors
not picked by the candidates and for the special case that the right answer is that
contestants (and thereby Sleeping Beauty) should be indifferent between switching
and staying. In that case, we need N = n candidates. Suppose they collectively pick
the jth door. We can now basically repeat the steps that got us from Eq. (19) to Eq.
(25). The two (non-equiprobable) outcomes are:
Dj = Checks behind j
th door, not-Dj = Checks not behind j
th door. (32)
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The priors are:
Pr(Dj) =
1
n
, Pr(not-Dj) =
n− 1
n
. (33)
The sizes of the groups assigned to these two outcomes are:
NDj = n− 1, Nnot-Dj = 1. (34)
The likelihoods are
Pr(A |Dj) =
NDj
N
=
n− 1
n
, Pr(A | not-Dj) =
Nnot-Dj
N
=
1
n
(35)
The posteriors are
Pr(Dj |A) = Pr(A |Dj) Pr(Dj)
Pr(A |Dj) Pr(Dj) + Pr(A | not-Dj) Pr(not-Dj) ,
(36)
Pr(not-Dj |A) = Pr(A | not-Dj) Pr(not-Dj)
Pr(A |Dj) Pr(Dj) + Pr(A | not-Dj) Pr(not-Dj) .
From Eqs. (33) and (35), we see that
Pr(A |Dj) Pr(Dj) = Pr(A | not-Dj) Pr(not-Dj) = n− 1
n2
, (37)
which means that
Pr(Dj |A) = Pr(not-Dj |A) = 1
2
. (38)
In other words, contestants in this game (and Sleeping Beauty in the variation on the
Sleeping Beauty Problem for which this game show is a proxy) should be indifferent
between staying and switching.
The original Monty Hall Problem becomes more intuitive if we increase the num-
ber of doors (n). The original Sleeping Beauty Problem becomes more intuitive if we
increase the number of potential awakenings (N). In this new problem that combines
the Sleeping Beauty Problem with the Monty Hall Problem the number of doors is
equal to the number of potential awakenings (n = N). Once again, the problem be-
comes more intuitive if we increase that number. The design of a game-show proxy
for this new problem, moreover, nicely illustrates how variations on the Sleeping
Beauty Problem can be turned into game shows that steer clear of the ambiguities
plaguing the original problem.
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